In the days before the Egyptian revolution, whenever you surfed the Discovery Channel, the National Geographic Channel, or the History Channel (before they abandoned history entirely for pawnshops, ghosts, and "Swamp People"), you could be sure of one thing: if the program dealt with Ancient Egypt, Zahi Hawass, then the Director of Antiquities, would appear in it, wearing his signature Indiana Jones hat, which you could also buy through his personal website. He may have been the first real celebrity TV archaeologist; when my daughter learned I'd met him many years ago and we had friends in common, she was more impressed than by my meeting actual heads of state. He was controversial, flamboyant, self-promoting, but he also interested a great many people in Ancient Egypt without invoking Ancient Astronauts or Secrets of the Great Pyramid. He brought money to Egypt, though the fact that he made quite a bit for himself raised hackles, as did allegations that he tended to hog the credit for discoveries made by subordinates. This blog used to post about him quite a bit, sometimes seriously, sometimes in fun. Came the Revolution: and then he was gone. He was convicted of corruption, though the verdict was later overturned.
Well, he hasn't gone far. Smithsonian has an interview: "The Rise and Fall and Rise of Zahi Hawass." He doesn't like Morsi of course, or his successors at the Antiquities Ministry, and he talks of a comeback. Modest as always, he compares himself to the dying and resurrecting God Osiris:
Today, Hawass finds parallels between his fall and that of Osiris. “I
had lots of enemies—the enemies of success,” he says. “They are the
friends of the god Set, the evil desert god in ancient Egypt.”
(As an Egyptologist he surely knows that when Isis put Osiris back together, there was one body part she couldn't find because a fish had eaten it. You can look it up. I suspect, however, this was not the image he wanted to convey, but rather that of resurrection.)
Like many of the old guard of the Mubarak era, he's survived various charges and seen convictions overturned, and he's still in the wings, promising a comeback. If Osiris can do it ...
The details of the hostages' release have not been officially
confirmed. A senior military source said that the Egyptian army used a
diversion strategy to secure the release of the hostages.
"The armed forces executed a diversion strategy by sending out mixed
information through news agencies," the source told Al-Ahram Arabic news
website.
"They (tribal leaders) were also the ones who persuaded the kidnappers to release the soldiers in the desert."
According to military spokesperson Colonel Ali, military intelligence
officials played a key role in the operation to free the soldiers, who
were abducted in North Sinai's capital, Al-Arish.
Whatever that means. I suspect the key line is the one about the tribal elders. This sidebar story suggests that this was more of a retaliation by local tribes than a planned terror operation; as usual, President Morsi is making promises to develop the Sinai and improve life there.
Nearly a month after Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika suffered a small stroke (excuse me, "transient ischemic attack," he remains out of the country and unseen in public. With Presidential elections due next year, the 76-year-old President's health remains a matter of speculation, especially since many expected him to seek a fourth term.
For the first time in some years two Algerian newspapers, Mon Journal and its Arabic version Djaridati, have been censored and been blocked from publication for publishing the rumor that Bouteflika is in a coma and has returned to Algiers. Publisher Hichem Aboud was quoted as saying:
“According to my sources -- I personally did not see anything, but I
have my sources, which I cross-check and verify -- the president is in
Algeria,” Hichem Aboud, head of both newspapers, told FRANCE 24.
“My sources say that he’s neither in Geneva, Switzerland, nor in the
Val-de-Grâce hospital in Paris. He is in Algeria. He arrived at dawn on
Wednesday [May 15], after leaving Paris at 3am,” specified the former
member of the military who now opposes the regime.
“His health is declining, which is why they transferred him to
Algiers,” said Aboud. “The Val-de-Grâce hospital could no longer help.
We’ve been told he’s in a deep coma that can go on for days or weeks.
That is what we put in those two pages.”
Rumors about Bouteflika's health have persisted for years. After surgery for a gastric ulcer (officially) in France in 2005, rumors spread that he had stomach cancer, and this was denied; he subsequently won a third term.
He has not yet announced for a fourth term but so long as the issue is open his party allies are reluctant to declare their own candidacies.
Usually during past health crises, Bouteflika has taken pains to make a public appearance; when he was rumored on the Internet to have died in 2012, he was promptly shown on television meeting people. His absence from appearing even in photographs from the hospital after a month is doubtless fueling the rumors of a coma.
After the disqualification of Hashemi-Rafsanjani and hundreds of other candidates by the Guardians council, the eight remaining men (no female candidates made the cut) standing in the Iranian Presidential elections (round one June 14, round two if needed June 21) are:
National Security Council chief and nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili
Tehran Mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf
Former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati
Former Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Commander (now Secretary of the Expediency Council) Mohsen Reza'ie
Former Oil Minister and Information Minister Mohammad Qarazi
Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel, a former Speaker of Parliament whose daughter married Supreme Leader Khamenei's son
Mohammad Aref, one of former President Khatami's Vice Presidents
Hassan Rowhani, the nuclear negotiator under Khatami
The last two, with their links to the Khatami era, are the only "reformers" still in the running.
Of the 686 registered candidates for President in Iran, only eight have been cleared to run by the Council of Guardians, and that eight does not include former President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani or current President Ahmadinejad's ally Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei. The exclusion of Rafsanjani, once one of the most powerful men in the country, who was seeking to run as a reformist, more or less guarantees that no one in the race can be called a reformer. While Leader Khamenei can overrule the decision, that may be unlikely; though Rafsanjani helped engineer Khamenei's succession to Imam Khomeini in 1989, they have long since become rivals. But this move may guarantee that the elections lack even limited credibility.
I've posted frequently on the dramatic change in attitude towards raqs sharqi or belly-dancing in Egypt in recent decades and especially since the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. During the bulk of the 20th century, however, belly-dancing was recognized as a major cultural expression, and other Arab countries looked to Egypt to provide the best talent. Egypt's most popular (though not necessarily its most critically acclaimed) films often included scenes with its best belly-dancers performing, either as an integral part of the plot or just to please the audiences. Its best belly-dancers also doubled as actresses; its most popular actresses who weren't dancers often did a dance if the plot required it, as was the case with Suad Husni in Khali Balak min Zouzou. Even Egyptian cinema's first recurring cartoon character, Mish-Mish Effendi, had a girlfriend named Baheya who was a belly-dancer. (You can see a Mish-Mish cartoon and watch Baheya dance at this earlier post.) As Islamist pressures increasingly limit this traditional art and restrict it to expensive tourist venues, I feel a cultural obligation to occasionally remember the golden age.
Most Egyptians and many other Arabs would agree that the greatest dancer and actress of them all was Tahia Carioca (1919-1999). Rising to stardom at Madame Badia Masabni's legendary Casino Opera, she achieved her greatest fame in the late 1930s and 1940s, dancing for King Farouq and beginning a movie career. A supporter of the 1952 revolution, she fell out with Nasser and was even jailed. She continued to act in films long after she stopped dancing, and lived to the age of 80. Unlike modern Western celebrities, she was a firm believer in marriage, marrying 14 times.
There is perhaps less agreement on the second greatest, but many would endorse Samia Gamal (1924-1994) for the title; she too came from Madame Badia's troupe, and was often seen as a slightly younger rival of Carioca.
Though often seen as rivals, one can find publicity pictures like the one at the top showing them together. But there's also this (1940s?) film clip showing Samia listening to an old style gramophone and imagining Carioca dancing on the lid as on a TV screen; then she imagines herself dancing with her. It's not necessarily the only film of them dancing together, but it's one I can play here:
It is neither a high-quality nor a particularly good clip, but it shows the two greats together. Both were enormously glamorous stars in their day: a "pinup" photo of Carioca, perhaps early 1940s(?):
And a stop-motion shot of Samia performing in her prime (1940s/early 1950s):
And both played love interest to the most popular romantic male star of
the era, actor/singer/oud player Farid al-Atrash; Samia and Farid were rumored to be lovers though they never married. Photos of Tahia (first)
and Samia (second) with Farid:
If things keep going the way they're going, we shall not gaze upon their like again.
No one confuses Iran with a genuine democracy, but its curious political system does make for genuine rivalries and occasional surprises. Suzanne Maloney of the Saban Center at Brookings offers a well-done explanation of "Why Iran's Presidential Election Matters."
The kidnapping of seven Egyptian security forces (one from the Army, four from State Security and two from Port Security Forces) in the largely lawless Sinai last Thursday has created a quandary for President Morsi: it underscores the weakness of the central government and its apparent inability to control its national territory, while also embarrassing the Army, which has lately been issuing reminders of its role as a supporter of legitimacy and a guarantor of stability. While Hamas in Gaza, allies of Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood, has reportedly stepped up border security, it's the Wild West lawlessness of northern Sinai that really is the issue.
But there is also the deeper issue of security nationwide, which has been severely degraded since the revolution. Growing incidents of mob violence, locals taking justice into their own hands, and lynchings have occurred in many rural areas of the Delta and Upper Egypt. The growing insecurity adds to the overall impression that the Muslim Brotherhood government is adrift and bereft of ideas.
The open involvement of Hizbullah (and, reportedly, of Lebanese Sunnis fighting on the rebel side), is now openly acknowledged; Hizbullah admits that at least 13 "martyrs" have fallen in the battle for Qusair. This fact, and the prospects of a significant tactical victory for the Syrian regime, may spur those calling for greater Western involvement in the Syrian conflict. The recent reports of Russia supplying new missiles to the regime are also likely to supply advocates for intervention with new ammunition. The Syrian war had seemed somewhat stalemated; sudden new advances on the regime side could tilt the balance.
At the very least I suspect the fighting in Qusair deserves the attention it is receiving in the Middle Eastern media, as opposed to the near silence about it here in the US, which I suspect may change given the role of Hizbullah.
TGIF. It's Friday. Time to relax, let one's hair down, and ... wait: isn't that Kemal Atatürk on that swing?
Atatürk has become such an iconic image in modern Turkey that I at least find it a little hard to picture him actually kicking back and having fun. As the deck chairs give away, the swing is on shipboard, aboard the steamer Ege during a voyage to Antalya in February 1935. (Picture is from here).
If the father of modern Turkey, usually portrayed on stamps and money with a stern, dignified visage, can kick back and enjoy a swing, well, all of you have a good weekend, too.
For no particular reason other than my training as a historian and my always looking for good blog topics, I was thinking about the Middle East 50 years ago, 1963. The world was in the midst of the Cold War, John Kennedy President of the US (until November) and Nikita Khrushchev running the USSR (with only a year to go). But in the Middle East there were still some real giants in the scene: some of the founders if the modern states and/or the prophets of a new era. They weren't all good men, and certainly they weren't all good leaders. Most were kings or dictators, and even the rare elected leaders leaned towards autocratic preferences.
Not all the leaders are memorable. Yemen was in the early days of its civil war. King Saud in Saudi Arabia was an embarrassment, soon to be deposed (the next year) by Prime Minister Prince Faisal. The Gulf was still under British rule, except for Kuwait. Iraq and Syria both had Baathist coups that year and new leaders had not yet emerged. Fouad Chehab in Lebanon is mostly remembered for steering the country out of the 1958 civil war, an early foreshadowing of what was to come in 1975-1990. Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü was a man of an earlier era, a nationalist hero brought back after a 1960 coup. Sudan's Ibrahim Abboud is largely forgotten. King Idris I in Libya was no power player.
But the big names seem, somehow, bigger in retrospect than their counterparts today, whether for good or ill: Nasser, Ben Gurion, the Shah,Bourguiba, and two relative newcomers in the Maghreb in 1963, Hassan II and Ben Bella.
Though he was President of Egypt only half as long as Husni Mubarak, Gamal Abdel Nasser's career is iconic: though he created the national security state that protected Mubarak and was no democrat, his message of Arab nationalism and his symbolic defiance of Britain, France, and Israel at Suez made him a hero for the Arab world and a villain to many in the West. His "Arab socialism," despite dubious results, made him popular at home. His leadership was at its height between the wars of 1956 and 1967; Egypt's crushing defeat in the latter war dimmed Nasser's reputation, and he died just over three years later in September 1970, only 52 years old.
I've run this clip of Nasser making fun of the Muslim Brotherhood before (it has subtitles in English, but the delivery is what matters, and you probably can get a good sense of Nasser's way with the crowd even if you don't know Arabic):
Declaring Independence 1948
Nasser's frequent adversary, Israel's David Ben-Gurion, is another figure whose reputation still vastly overshadows the country's more recent leaders. Founding father and first Prime Minister, Ben-Gurion read the declaration of Israel's independence 65 years ago and was still politically active almost until his final illness in 1973. He served as Prime Minister from 1948-1954 and 1955-1964 (Moshe Sharett's Prime Ministership is remembered mostly by history buffs).
Ben-Gurion feuded with his successor, Levi Eshkol, split with his old party Mapai (ancestor of Labor), started a new party, Rafi, and eventually split with that as well. After retiring to his Negev kibbutz, Ben-Gurion remained active in politics, meeting with political figures before and during the 1967 war as if he were still in charge. He lived to see the 1973 war as well. Though in his last years he had withdrawn from political office he remained a powerful force to be reckoned with.
Many Egyptians still venerate Nasser; Ben-Gurion has the country's major airport, a university in his beloved Negev, and streets in most cities named for him. In contrast, another dominant figure in the region 50 years ago, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shahanshah and Aryamehr (Light of the Aryans), lies buried in a mosque in Egypt, after dying in a troubled exile; he is excoriated in Iran. The second and last of the Pahlavi dynasty was installed by the allies in place of his father in 1941, restored to power after the coup against Mossadegh, and ruled until 1979, when, a few years after celebrating 2500 years of monarchy in Iran, he was driven from the Peacock Throne. But in the 1960s the Shah was reaching the height of his power; revolution and exile seemed remote possibilities.
In North Africa, Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia was already 60 years old in 1963, founding father of his country. A hero of the national independence effort against the French, and famously a vigorous secularist and Westernizer. He was widely respected and influential regionally at the time. Bourguiba would increasingly prove intolerant of opposition, jailing rivals and even disowning his own son and political heir; he had himself named President-for-Life, and clung to power stubbornly long after his faculties were badly impaired; finally deposed by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on grounds of senility in 1987, he lived on until 2000, dying at the age of 98 (officially: some think he was older than admitted and may have been 100 or 101). His reputation would be healthier had he not hung on to power so long; but while his successor Ben Ali is disgraced and in (admittedly comfortable) exile, the most elegant boulevard in Tunis remains Avenue Bourguiba.
The other two leaders in the Maghreb were still new to power. King Hassan II of Morocco became King in February 1961 after the sudden death of his father during supposedly routine surgery at the age of only 51. He was still something of an unknown quantity in 1963, but his reign was to last until 1999, surviving plots and assassinations, crushing real or suspected rivals, and dominating the Kingdom. His son now sits on his throne.
The third Maghreb leader would serve for only two years, but he was a powerful symbol: after its bloody 12-year struggle against France, Algeria had finally won its independence in 1962, and Ahmed Ben Bella became its President in 1963. One of nine historic leaders of the FLN, based in Cairo during the war of independence, France notoriously intercepted his plane in 1956 and held him prisoner until 1962. He defined himself as an Arab Nationalist and an ally of Nasser's, but in 1965 he would be overthrown by his military chief, Houari Boumedienne.
Ben Bella in old age
Ben Bella spent decades in exile, eventually returning to Algeria. He survived to the venerable age of 95, dying just over a year ago in April 2012, and was given a state funeral by an Algeria whose population were mostly born after his overthrow and who did not remember him: but an Algeria still ruled by his old comrade-in-arms and first Foreign Minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika.
Powerful figures. Their heirs and successors today, I would venture to say with confidence, remain in their shadows, though many of them ruled with an iron hand.
Laura Rozen at Al-Monitor's The Back Channel has a profile of Saeed Jalili, the Iranian National Security Council chief, nuclear negotiator and now, Presidential candidate. Since many believe that Jalili is the favored candidate of Ayatollah Khamenei, he may prove to be someone we all need to get to know.
The Middle East Institute has announced the official launch of its new Arab Transitions website, offering a wide range of news and opinion on the transitions in the Arab world, with an initial focus on Egypt. There's a lot of material there already, and more to come. Do take a look.
The new site is also part of s redesigned main MEI website, which I commend to you as well; you'll even find a link to this blog on there. Congratulations to our new Arab Transitions Project and to the general website as well.
May 15 is marked (certainly not "celebrated") as Nakba Day by Palestinians, the date in 1948 on which the British Mandate for Palestine formally ended and the first Arab-Israeli War/Israeli War of Independence began, still known among Palestinians as the nakba, the catastrophe. Israel had proclaimed its independence the day before, on May 14, but due to the differences between the (mostly lunar) Hebrew calendar and the solar Western calendar, the two dates today rarely coincide, since Israelis celebrate Yom Ha'Atzmaut or Independence Day on the Hebrew date of 5 Iyar (this year it was April 16, just about a month ago), Israel has already celebrated its 65th birthday, while Palestinians are marking 65 years of their own loss today. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict at age 65 has made a few faltering steps towards a solution, but is not yet ready for retirement.
Despite the difference in dates observing the same event, this year sees an interesting and perhaps ironic juxtaposition: the Jewish holiday of Shavuot began at sundown last night. And there are some interesting symbolic aspects to this coincidence of Nakba Day and Shavuot.
Shavuot (in English Bibles and the New Testament often translated literally as the "Feast of Weeks") comes seven weeks after Passover and traditionally marks the giving of the Torah to the Jewish People at Mount Sinai. But Shavuot also has a traditional linkage to the Biblical Book of Ruth. As the Wikipedia Shavuot article notes:
The Book of Ruth (מגילת רות, Megillat Ruth)
is read on Shavuot because: (1) King David, Ruth's descendant, was born
and died on Shavuot [Y Chagigah 2:3]; (2) Shavuot is harvest time
[Exodus 23:16], and the events of Book of Ruth occur at harvest time;
(3) The gematria (numerical value) of Ruth is 606, the number of
commandments given at Sinai in addition to the 7 Noahide Laws already
given, for a total of 613; (4) Ruth was a convert, and all Jews also
entered the covenant on Shavuot, when the Torah was given; (5) The
central theme of the book is loving-kindness, and the Torah is about
loving-kindness; (6) Ruth was allowed to marry Boaz on the basis of the
Oral Law's interpretation of the verse, "A Moabite may not marry into
the Congregation of the Lord." (Deut. 23:4). This points to the unity of
the Written and Oral Torahs.
What was once a familiar story may deserve a summary here: Naomi and her husband Elimelech had moved from Bethlehem in Judah to Moab, and their two sons married Moabite women. Naomi's husband and both sons then died, and Naomi determined to return to her own people. One of the daughters-in-law, Orpah, agrees. The other, Ruth, has other ideas.
Most Gentiles will best know Ruth for its famous line in Chapter I, verse
16 (KJV), which has entered the familiar phrases of the English
language:
16 And Ruth said, Entreat me not to leave thee: for
whither thou goest, I will go; and where thou lodgest, I will lodge: thy
people shall be my people, and thy God my God:
Returning to Bethlehem with Naomi, she marries a kinsman of Naomi named Boaz, and becomes the Moabite ancestor of the future royal line of Judah. Ruth carries much symbolism, not just of loyalty, but of the role of the outsider: Ruth is a direct ancestor of King David, yet a non-Hebrew Moabite; the gospel genealogies of Jesus, which trace him to David and beyond, also include Ruth, the Gentile ancestor of Jesus.
I'm not going to belabor the imagery here. But the coincidence of the 65th anniversary of Nakba Day and the major Jewish holiday that celebrates assimilation with an outsider seemed worth a comment. Especially lately.
Greetings to readers celebrating Shavuot, acknowledgment and sympathy to readers celebrating Nakba Day. May the reconciliation of outsiders not be merely a nice Late Bronze Age/Early Iron Age legend, and the integration of the other be embraced.
Since tomorrow happens to be Nakba day (fuller post coming), some Palestinian readers might feel I'm being overly flippant by posting this piece tonight. Please accept my assurances that I intend it as the sort of quirky cultural story I frequently post, and the date is purely coincidental, at least on my part.
We have heard much about the Gaza tunnels, usually in connection with arms smuggling, infiltration, and the like, with both Israel and Egypt portraying the tunnels in a sinister manner, and I don't doubt some highly dubious material and personalities do pass through them. But, if this Xinhua Chinese news agency report is accurate, you can also use them for KFC delivery. Yes, since Colonel Sanders isn't available in Gaza, you can order from al-Arish in Egypt. The English, presumably translated from the Chinese by the same people who translate computer manuals and Chinese menus, is a little rocky, but the meaning is fairly clear:
At Al-Yamama delivery company in the Gaza City, the
floor is filled with boxes of fast food with the famous face of Colonel
Sanders, the founder of KFC.
However, there are no KFC restaurant in this Palestinian coastal
sliver of land as the regular absence of raw materials and Israeli
restrictions on Gaza crossings make it difficult to open an
international fast food branch here.
But ordering fast food from one of the world's most popular
restaurants has become possible in Gaza after Al-Yamama started to bring
the food from the Egyptian North Sinai, which borders Gaza.
The fried chicken make their [sic] way from one of the many underground smuggling tunnels beneath the Gaza-Egypt border.
As cheap fast food goes, it's neither cheap nor fast:
Since late last month, they have made four deliveries
of KFC food to Palestinians in Gaza, with every delivery including
about two dozens of combos.
The clients include both those who have traveled outside Gaza and the people who never stepped a foot out of Gaza.
"It's delicious even as it's not hot," said Aboud Fares, a 22-
year-old student, as he bit a mouthful of a chicken breast. His sister,
who traveled several times to Egypt, was enjoying the KFC apple pie.
The price of a KFC family meal is about 80 Egyptian pounds ( about 11
U.S. dollars) at el-Arish KFC restaurant, but getting it in Gaza costs
as much as 100 Israeli Shekels (30 dollars).
The delivery company says the higher price is due to the transportation and smuggling fees.
Those seem steep prices for Gaza. And there are other impediments:
Al-Madani also said that they do not face a lot
obstacles in bringing the food to Gaza, but the delivery may be delayed
due to various reasons.
"Sometimes Hamas checks the meal boxes and sometimes the taxi that picks up the orders from Sinai is late," he said.
I'm pretty sure KFC is halal unless it's cooked in lard (highly unlikely in al-Arish, I should think),but maybe Hamas inspectors like the Colonel's products too.
This interesting YouTube video shows a tram ride to the pyramids, dated in the "1910s," according to the caption. Village scenes, the tram, a couple of early cars.
The Carnegie Endowment's Thomas Carothers has an interesting piece on the beleaguered Egyptian opposition, "Egypt's Dismal Opposition: A Second Look." While admitting that the usual criticisms of the fractious non-Islamist opposition are valid, he suggests that a comparative approach considering the experience in other emerging democracies provides some perspective:
In fact, the Egyptian opposition does not
look so bad compared to the political opposition forces in other places
at similar historical moments, such as Romania’s famously feckless
opposition parties of the early post-Ceauşescu years, Serbia’s
notoriously fractious opposition parties of the late 1990s, and
Argentina’s political opposition for at least the last ten years. It
includes several politicians of genuine stature, such as Amr Moussa and
Mohamed ElBaradei, and others less well-known but of real political
energy and smarts. Cooperation among many of the opposition parties is
growing rather than diminishing. Last November’s formation of the
National Salvation Front, an alliance of opposition parties, was a
valuable step in this regard, even if it falls apart in the run-up to
the parliamentary election slated for later this year. Some opposition
figures and parties do have constituencies beyond Cairo and are making
efforts to build organizational structures in diverse parts of the
country.
The opposition parties may not have an adequate set of proposed
political programs to meet Egypt’s many challenges, yet neither are they
completely bereft on the policy front. When the parliament met in the
first half of last year, some of the opposition parties did engage in
meaningful reform efforts within various parliamentary committees, such
as the human rights committee. And overall the opposition evinces a
relatively low degree of demagogy or reckless populism, especially in
comparison to various political movements or parties in South Asia,
South America, southern Europe, and other parts of the world.
Add to the "[Stuff] Salafis Say" file this wondrous quote from a Salafi Nour Party MP in Egypt, according to Ahram Online:
"The Shi[‘]as are more dangerous than naked [women]," MP Tharwat Attallah of the Salafist Nour Party said during the meeting.
"They are a danger to Egypt's national security; Egyptians could be deceived into [converting to] Shi[‘]ism, giving it a chance to spread in Egypt," he added.
I hope you don't mind the bracketed ‘ayns. I'm not always pedantic, but I refuse to omit consonants.
Now, there are no doubt some dangerous Shi‘a. I'm not, personally, a great lover of Hizbullah or the Iranian Revolution Guards Corps, but I've known plenty of Lebanese and Iraqi Shi‘a who were fine people. Similarly, I suppose naked women can be dangerous, since it was just last month that, during the so-called International Topless Jihad Day, the Ukrainian feminist group Femen proclaimed that their bare breasts (they actually said "tits" but I'm euphemizing) "are deadlier than your stones," and "deadly" = "dangerous" seems fair. But I'm not sure these are really comparable threats. (Or, well, threats at all.)
But then, since this was a case of the Shura Council questioning the Tourism Ministry, by "naked women" the Salafi speaker may have meant "tourists in bikinis," a perennial threat to Salafism, since in Egypt, actual naked women are as thin on the ground as actual Shi‘a. Aliaa Elmahdy left the country some time back (and has most recently gotten naked in Sweden, but I don't think it's considered dangerous there), easing the terrible danger of anyone being naked in Egypt.
My own answer to the "Shi‘a" versus "naked women" debate is, "why can't we have both?"
Though I read Ahram Online daily I nearly missed this gem, so a hat tip to Khalil Al-anani for linking to it, though he has absolutely no responsibility whatsoever for my comments on said link.
The US Congress May be focused on events in Benghazi several months ago, but Libyans are much more focused on what happened in Benghazi today. A car bombing outside a hospital killed at least three, possibly more, and wounded many, and across the country this latest act of violence seems to have awakened a sense of unity transcending regional rivalries and partisan quarreling, as people deplore the instability that still plagues the country and the lack of security. More here and here.
Old Cairo hands will recognize the joys of the sandstorm known as the Khamsin, when the desert moves into town and turns everything sand colored. The other side of the Nile is in there somewhere, I think.
The fact that 78-year-old former Iranian President (and former just about everything else) Hashemi-Rafsanjani has again thrown his turban into the ring, and that a key backer of outgoing President Ahmadinejad also registered for the Presidential elections at the eleventh hour, could make for an interesting election this summer — but not necessarily. The Guardians Council has yet to vet the candidates and may cut several. Assuming Rafsanjani's credentials are solid enough to stay in the race, his page, his past record, and his defeat in 2005 by Ahmadinejad when he last attempted a comeback suggest that we should not put too much weight on the likelihood of his returning to power. (It also says something about Iran's ideological evolution that this one time right-hand-man to Ruhollah Khomeini is being billed as the reformist candidate.
Rafsanjani is better known than most of the candidates, but a number of them (Ali Akbar Velayati, Saeed Jalili, Ali Baqer Qalibaf) have widespread name recognition, and Qalibaf was apparently popular as Tehran Mayor. Ahmadinejad ally Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei was another late entry. As a result, the field includes most of the political spectrum that the regime allows to function politically. But Rafsanjani may have dissuaded others on the reformist wing from standing.
The aftermath of the 2009 elections and the birth of the Green movement still evoke some bitterness. Will these elections be viewed as fair? Of course, it's a loaded question given the Council of Guardians' ability to disqualify candidates.
And work on the official statements in which we avoid discussing the differences that have separated the churches for over 1500 years, but congratulate each other on becoming Pope:
I'm working on some longer posts that will go up later, I hope, but for now here's your weekend nostalgia: Some pictures (photos or old lithographs) from the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, from various sources:
Though he (or she) only mentions Egypt and Sumeria in the very last line of their first post at a new blog called Ancient Ale, given the Middle East's clear priority in the field, this new blog by an archaeologist of the brewer's art may just fill an important need in the blogosphere. Looks like a bookmark.
I hope this doesn't seem too risquéto come right after a post about a gathering of Popes.
Popular media sometimes over-dramatize archaeological finds, and oversimplify what archaeologists and Egyptologists tell them in interviews, so I'm not sure if this is a case of a quotation out of context, or what. This Los Angeles Times article starts with a sensational headline: "Uncovered: Ritual Public Sex and Drunkenness in Ancient Egypt." It quotes Egyptologist Betsy Bryan of Johns Hopkins, and gets off to an unpromising start:
I'll bet you that archaeologist Betsy Bryan's perspective on
reality-show behavior is a little longer than most. Since 2001, Bryan
has led the excavation of the temple complex of the Egyptian goddess Mut
in modern-day Luxor, the site of the city of Thebes in ancient Egypt.
And the ritual she has uncovered, which centers on binge drinking,
thumping music and orgiastic public sex, probably makes "Jersey Shore"
look pretty tame.
Well, that doesn't suggest sensationalism in any way. She's discussing ritual mass drinking and public sex in conjunction with the legends of the goddess Hathor and her related form Sekhmet (both assimilated to some extent with Mut). Mut is a mother goddess; Hathor a cow goddess seen as a fertility symbol; Sekhmet is a lion goddess with fertility aspects. She associates the practice with bringing back the Nile flood, and says:
The destruction wrought by Hathor is the background to the level of
drinking that goes on in the festival: It's not just to drink but to
drink to pass out. A hymn inscribed in a temple associated with the lion
goddess describes young women, dressed with floral garlands in their
hair, who serve the alcohol. It is described as a very sensual
environment.
Okay. Fertility rituals. But then comes this curious (if correctly quoted) exchange:
Q. And what was the sex about?
A. The sex is
about the issue of fertility and renewal, and about bringing the Nile
flood back to ensure the fertility of the land as well. The festival of
drunkenness typically occurred in mid-August, just as the Nile waters
begin to rise.
We don't have the same kind of clarity as to why
the sex is included as we have with the drinking. When I first
speculated there was a sexual component to these rituals, I got a lot of
push-back from colleagues who didn't believe it.
Since the expert seems not to "have the same kind of clarity as to why
the sex is included as we have with the drinking," perhaps a non-Egyptologist can offer a wild theory:
The men, we are told, are drinking "not just to drink but to
drink to pass out."
They are surrounded by "young women, dressed with floral garlands in their
hair, who serve the alcohol. It is described as a very sensual
environment." There is no indication these young women are in any way unwilling participants.
It is associated with the Nile flood, the profound symbol of fertility in Egypt for millennia.
It is celebrated in temples and stories of three goddesses associated with motherhood, fertility, and sex.
You do the math.
Where's the lack of clarity as to "why the sex is included"? It's a Bacchanalia or other similar Dionysian fertility rite in which drink, sex, and fertility are all intermixed. I suspect the professor either was misquoted or misspoke. This sounds like familiar stuff all the way back to The Golden Bough. And I'm not condoning it and no, it really did have a religious component; it's not just an excuse for an orgiastic frat house party. (Well, maybe it was, but apparently they did it in temples.)
It is 40 years since Pope Shenouda III went to the Vatican and met with Pope Paul VI in 1973; that was the first meeting of the Coptic and Catholic leaders since the churches split after the Council of Chalcedon in 451 AD. Pope John Paul II also met with Pope Shenouda in Cairo in 2000 while visiting the Middle East, but it is the first trip to the Vatican by a Coptic Pope since that 1973 visit.
If we could have gotten Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI to drop by they'd have had three Popes in the Vatican at once.
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